No Pass No Drive: Education and Allocation of Time by BARUA, Rashmi Rekha & Vidal-Fernandez, Marian
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Economics School of Economics
1-2013
No Pass No Drive: Education and Allocation of
Time
Rashmi Rekha BARUA
Singapore Management University, rashmibarua@smu.edu.sg
Marian Vidal-Fernandez
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research
Part of the Economics Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Economics at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Economics by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge
at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
BARUA, Rashmi Rekha and Vidal-Fernandez, Marian. No Pass No Drive: Education and Allocation of Time. (2013). Research
Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1475
No Pass No Drive: Education and Allocation of Time
Rashmi Baruay Marian Vidal-Fernandezz
October 2011
Abstract
Since the late 1980s, several states in the US have introduced No Pass No Drive
(NPND) laws that set minimum academic requirements for teenagers under 18 to obtain
a driving license. Using data from the U.S. Census and Monitoring the Future (MTF)
survey, we exploit cross-state, cross-cohort and cross-time variation in NPND laws to
study their e¤ect on educational outcomes and allocation of time among teenagers.
Estimates using the Census show that NPND laws have a positive and signicant ef-
fect on both years of completed schooling and the probability of high school completion
among boys and blacks, but not girls. Our results are robust with respect to several
internal validity checks. Using the MTF, we show that NPND laws were e¤ective in
reducing truancy. We also nd evidence of increased time allocated to school-work at
the expense of leisure and employment activities.
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1 Introduction
Educators and policy makers are increasingly paying more attention towards one of Americas
most disturbing educational trend: more than one-third of all public high school students
fail to graduate with their class.1 Dropout rates are particularly high among boys and
blacks. This phenomenon has been termed the silent epidemicand has forced states to
take several initiatives to keep students in school. Among the di¤erent interventions that
have been introduced, much attention has been paid recently to the use of performance-
based cash or in-kind rewards to motivate students to stay in school and improve academic
achievement. Large scale nancial incentive programs have been evaluated in the U.S. and
worldwide.2 Most of these studies advocate for nancial incentives or carrots as a more direct
and cost-e¤ective way to improve student outcomes compared to traditional input-oriented
initiatives (e.g., more teachers, higher teacher salaries, smaller class sizes, improving school
infrastructure etc.). Furthermore, many of these studies nd that girls respond better to
nancial incentives compared to boys.
Though a surprisingly large number of studies have evaluated the e¤ect of performance-
based incentives, not much is known about how negative incentives or sticksa¤ect educa-
tion outcomes. In a recent survey of high school dropouts, 38 percent of respondents cited
too much freedomand too many distractions as a factor in their decision to drop out from
high school.3 In the same survey, 68 percent felt that their respective schools should have
tried to stop students from skipping classes. This suggests that a policy that addresses both
school attendance requirements and out of school distractions might be an e¤ective way to
1Swanson, Christopher B. (2004). "Who Graduates? Who Doesnt? A Statistical Portrait of Public High
School Graduation", Class of 2001. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute
2Some recent examples include Angrist and Lavy (2009), Angrist et al. (2009), Berry (2009), Bettinger
(2010), Dee (2011), Fryer (2010) and Kremer, et al. (2009).
3Bridgeland, J.M., Dilulio, Jr., J.J., and Morison, K.B. (2006, March). The silent epidemic: Perspectives
of high school dropouts.
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keep students in school.
In this paper, we study the e¤ect of one such policy, the No Pass No Drive (NPND) law,
on education outcomes. We take advantage of a natural experiment to answer whether
sticks might be more cost-e¤ective than carrots to increase educational attainment
among teenagers, and if so, through what channels.
Since the late 1980s, many U.S. states have set restrictions for teenagers to have access
to a driverslicense. Students must continually earn their driving privileges by staying in
school and, in some states, passing their courses. The regulation is intended to motivate
academically marginal students, who enjoy the freedom associated with driving, to work
harder or, to stay, in school. These laws, commonly known as No Pass No Drive (NPND)
laws, vary across states in their scope. While most states require the applicant to be enrolled
in, attending school, and/or condition license on courses passed, some states deny or revoke
driving licenses to minors who are involved in unacceptable behavior such as possession
of illegal substances or violent behavior. For instance, Kentucky implemented the NPND
legislation in August 2007. According to the state statute, When a sixteen or seventeen
year old student drops out of school or is declared to be academically decient, the schools will
report electronically to the Division of Driver Licensing. The Division of Driver Licensing
will suspend the students privilege to drive and notify the driver of the suspension (KRS
159.051). Similarly, Florida passed NPND law in 1997 in an attempt to reduce truancy and
improve academic performance. In 2010, the state suspended 5,389 students licenses for
truancy, and sent warnings to another 24,090 students with learners permit who were at
risk for a delay in getting their license.4
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we study the e¤ect of a negative incentive policy on
long run education outcomes. On the one hand, imposing minimum academic requirements
can increase education by motivating students who want to gain driving privileges to do
better in school. On the other hand, if a student drives to school or to work, taking away
4Source: Data tracked by the Florida Department of Motor Vehicles in cooperation with the Florida
Department of Education.
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his driving privileges might in fact increase dropout rates and decrease lifetime income. We
use data from the 2009 U.S. American Community Survey (ACS) to compare the academic
outcomes of treated cohorts who were young enough to have been a¤ected by the NPND
laws to older cohorts in the same state, relative to other control states in the sample. Our
results indicate that NPND laws have a signicantly large e¤ect on education outcomes
among boys and blacks, but not girls. In particular, it led to a 2.8 percentage point increase
in average educational attainment among black males and a 6.4 percentage point increase in
the probability of graduating from high school. This result is particularly relevant because
dropout rates are alarmingly high among blacks and males. Moreover, several studies suggest
that males are less likely to respond to nancial incentives.
Second, we study the channel through which NPND policy has an e¤ect on education. In
particular, if this policy changes time invested in education, it should also a¤ect allocation of
time between leisure and work. We use a di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach with repeated
cross-sectional data of high school students from the Monitoring the Future (MTF) survey
to conrm changes in time allocation that led to an increase in education. We nd that
NPND laws were e¤ective in reducing truancy, including increased school attendance among
females. We also nd evidence of increased time allocated to homework, mainly among
blacks, at the expense of leisure and employment activities.
These results reassure that the laws were e¤ective in increasing educational attainment
among youth and shifted time invested in education in expense of leisure and work. Further,
the largest gains in education outcomes are for males and disadvantaged groups. Results
for both sets of data are robust to including state-specic education, tra¢ c and economic
controls. The results are also robust to several checks to internal validity threats.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the background
and literature pertinent to our study. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis and
presents the empirical strategy. In Section 4 we show the main results from the study.
Finally, we conclude the discussion in Section 5.
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2 Background and Related Literature
The e¤ect of carrots or positive incentives on education outcomes have been well documented
and debated. Among social scientists the popular view for over 30 years has been that cash
incentives destroy intrinsic motivation to learn (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Frey and
Jegen, 2001). Contrary to this extreme view, recent empirical work in economics of education
has shown heterogeneity in the e¤ect of rewards on individuals. While some students improve
their outcomes in response to incentives, others are either not a¤ected or are worse o¤.
Leuven, Oosterbeek, and van der Klaauw (2010) evaluate a randomized experiment on
the e¤ects of nancial incentives on undergraduate studentsachievement in University of
Amsterdam. They nd that high-ability students have larger pass rates and more credit
points when assigned to reward groups. In contrast, the achievement of low-ability students
drops when assigned to larger reward groups. Angrist, Lang, and Oreopolous (2009) evaluate
the e¤ects of nancial rewards linked to Grade Point Average (GPA) performance in a
Canadian university. They nd that nancial incentives improve performance among female
students but not among males. This is consistent with an Israeli study by Angrist and
Lavy (2009) who nd a positive e¤ect on matriculation rates among girls, but not boys, who
were provided cash incentives to complete a matriculation certicate. Bettinger (2010) nds
more direct evidence that incentives did not lower measures of intrinsic motivation among
elementary-school students in a low-income section of Ohio. In large scale randomized trials
done in four U.S. cities, Fryer (2010) shows that incentives that are linked to inputs (such as
attendance, homework, good behavior, etc.) lead to an improvement in student achievement.
In comparison, incentives that are conditional on performance are much less e¤ective.
So far, there has been little discussion on the e¤ect of stickson student outcomes. Poli-
cies that impose a penalty on under performing students are not so popular among educators
and policy makers because they decrease the set of choices available to children. Moreover,
for researchers, there are ethical issues involved in conducting randomized controlled trials
that would penalize one group of students. As a result, empirical work on the e¤ect of nega-
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tive incentives on outcomes has been largely ignored even though such means are commonly
used by parents and teachers.
To our knowledge, only two papers have addressed this issue in the literature. In a study
of Canadian college students, Lindo, Sanders, and Oreopoulus (2009) nd that being placed
on academic probation  the student must earn a GPA above the campus-set standard
in the next term or he will be suspended from the university for one year more than
doubles the probability that Canadian males drop out of college but no such discouragement
e¤ect is found for female college students. Another typical form of negative incentive is
to require students to improve their performance in order to gain a particular privilege.
Vidal-Fernández (2011) analyzes state interscholastic associations rules imposed during the
1970s in the U.S. that required student athletes to pass a certain number of subjects in
order to be allowed to participate in school sports. Using women as a placebo group, she
nds that a one-subject increase in the minimum academic standard is associated with a
two-percentage-point increase in the probability of high school graduation.5
The results of these two papers seem to be opposite, but in theory, penalizing students
for not meeting academic standards might actually raise or lower high school graduation
rates. On the one hand, academically marginal students who want to stay in college (or,
play high school sports) may be motivated to work harder to remain in college (or, on the
school sports team). On the other hand, some students will simply give-upbecause the
utility cost associated with the extra academic e¤ort exceeds the benets of staying in college
(or, getting to play high school sports). If the second e¤ect dominates the rst, graduation
rates might actually decline as a state adds another course requirement to the minimum
academic standards  clearly opposite the regulations intention. Therefore, the stricter
is the minimum academic requirement, the less likely we are to nd a positive impact on
graduation rates.
Unlike carrots, negative incentives would be most e¤ective if they target an activity that
5A key limitation of this paper is that if men and women are a¤ected di¤erentially by unobserved factors
in states with sports restrictions, the identication strategy is questionable.
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students have a preference for. If a student does not want to be in school in the rst place,
placing him/her on probation is only going to make it easier for him to drop out. On the
other hand, if the stakes are related to an activity that students enjoy or consider important,
the policy might be e¤ective.
NPND laws di¤er from the policies analyzed in Lindo et. at (2009) and Vidal-Fernández
(2011) in a relevant aspect. While these laws limit access to driving privileges and therefore
are also a negative incentive, they do not a¤ect the utility of staying in school, but instead,
they make the outside option of dropping out less attractive if students have a preference
for driving. Therefore, it is not so obvious why NPND laws should negatively a¤ect dropout
rates.6
Our contribution to the literature is two-fold. This is the rst paper that studies the
e¤ect of a negative incentive policy, that links driving privileges to school attendance, on
long run education outcomes in the U.S..7 Second, using a unique dataset of 8th and 12th
graders, we also study the e¤ect of the law on time allocation in order to understand the
channel through which it e¤ects education. To our knowledge, this is the rst study that
has used individual level data from the MTF to look at time use outcomes among students.
It is important to note that NPND laws should directly e¤ect only those individuals
who have a strong preference for driving. Driving among teenagers is considered an integral
aspect of maturation and socialization processes. If we assume that males have a stronger
preference for driving, we should expect a larger e¤ect of NPND for them. Moreover, the law
would have the largest impact on marginal students who are at a high risk of dropping out.
Thus, intuitively, this law should be most e¤ective in addressing attendance issues among
males and disadvantaged groups.
6We could potentially nd a negative e¤ect on education if students who drove to school are no longer
able to attend school because they lose their driving license.
7Lee (2011) exploits state variation in the repeal of Sunday closing laws to study the e¤ect of policies
outside of school on education outcomes. She argues that these laws a¤ected education through their e¤ect
on time-competing options among youth.
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3 Data and Empirical Framework
3.1 NPND Laws
Over the past two decades, 26 states have implemented policies that link driver licenses to
school attendance, academic performance, or behavior. In 1988, West Virginia became the
rst state in North America to revoke or deny driving privileges to teenagers who do not show
satisfactory progress in school. Wisconsin followed suit. We compiled data on NPND laws
from state legal statutes for the period 1988 to 2008. As of 2008, 26 states have implemented
NPND laws. The highlighted area in gure 1 refer to those states that had the law in place
in the most recent year in our sample.
As shown in Table 1, among these 26 states, seventeen condition a students driving
privilege exclusively on compliance with attendance requirements. For the remaining states,
other factors are also taken into account such as satisfactory academic progress and sus-
pension or expulsion from school. Table 1 also shows that the minimum age at which the
individual is bound by the law is 15 for most states. In most cases, the law is applicable
until the individual turns 18.
3.2 American Community Survey
To study the e¤ect of NPND laws on education outcomes, we use data from the 2009 round
of the U.S. Census Bureaus American Community Survey (ACS). We match data from the
ACS with information on state level minimum and maximum age requirements to identify
cohorts that were a¤ected by the NPND law in the year in which the law was enacted. For
the analysis on high school graduation rates, the birth cohorts examined span from 1958 to
1990. We do this to ensure that the youngest individual in our sample is at least 19 years
old and has completed high school (i.e. someone born in 1990). This also ensures that the
oldest individual was 30 years old when the rst law was passed in 1988 (i.e. someone born
in 1958). For the analysis on completed years of schooling, we restrict the sample to those
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individuals who are at least 24 years old. Therefore, the sample consists of cohorts born
between 1957 and 1985.
Our baseline specication to study the e¤ect of NPND laws on education outcomes is
given by,
Eisc = 1Treatmentsc + 2Xisc + 3Rsc + S +B + "isc (1)
Where, Treatmentsc is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual belongs to
the treated cohort c in state of birth s. Treatmentsc is equal to 1 for all individuals who
were younger than 13 in the year the law was passed. We chose age 13 because it is the
youngest age at which teenagers are eligible for drivers license in our data (see Table 1).
The control group (Treatmentsc = 0) are those individuals who were older than 18 when
a law was passed in their state. Individuals between the ages of 14 to 18 in the year the
law was passed are omitted from the sample because we cannot identify to what extent
they would have been a¤ected by the law. S and B refer to state of birth and year of
birth xed e¤ects, Xisc includes controls for gender and race. Rsc includes a set of state-
specic demographic (log population), economic (log per capita income and unemployment
rate), and education controls (log of per pupil expenditure, the pupil teacher ratio and log
of teacher salary)8 associated with the birth cohort at age 13. All income and expenditure
variables are ination adjusted.
We merge data on NPND laws with the census data using state of birth identier. Using
state of birth instead of state of residence avoids any bias that may be introduced due to
career-induced migration. Standard errors are clustered by state and year (Bertrand, Duo
& Mullainathan, 2004). The entire sample consists of 1,059,305 observations including states
that never passed NPND laws.
Our coe¢ cient of interest, 1, in this specication is identied using cross-state and cross-
cohort variation. For instance, in California, where law was adopted in 1991, Treatmentsc=1
8All state level education data has been obtained from the National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES).
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for those born between 1978 and 1990 and Treatmentsc=0 for those born before 1972. The
second di¤erence is to individuals of the same birth cohort in other states in the sample that
did not have NPND laws at the time.
The crucial identifying assumption is that education outcomes do not vary systematically
across cohorts in the treatment and control states over time. There could be potential internal
validity threats to this conventional identication assumption. First, if education outcomes
were reacting to other laws that were being implemented around the same time, our estimates
would be biased. Second, there could be mean reversion if there was a downward trend in
educational attainment in treatment states at the time of the enactment of the NPND laws
but not in control states. Third, the intervention could be a response to another factor that
simultaneously inuences both the policy and outcome. Besley and Case (2000) point out
the importance of controlling for such policy endogeneity. For instance, the sudden increase
in teen accident fatality rates or tra¢ c violations could lead to states passing NPND laws.
One could argue that due to the increased accident rates, parents forbid their children from
driving to school and that in turn inuences their allocation of time and education outcomes.
To account for these factors, we check for threats to internal validity in several ways.
First, we present evidence on the robustness of our key results to introducing a rich set of
state-specic demographic, economic, and education controls. To address the issue of policy
endogeneity caused by tra¢ c related outcomes, we run a version of the baseline regressions
controlling for two additional state level tra¢ c control variables: the log of vehicle miles
traveled and the log of total motor vehicle fatalities among 15-17 year olds. Third, we include
state-specic linear time trends in the regressions. Fourth, we directly test if our results are
being driven by minimum school entrance age laws that were being passed in states around
the same time as NPND laws. Finally, we run placebo regressions among older cohorts who
were not directly a¤ected by the NPND laws. If the identication strategy is valid, we should
nd that NPND laws have no e¤ect on education outcomes of older cohorts.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for key variables used in the baseline speci-
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cation. The average educational attainment in the sample is 13.5 years with a high school
graduation rate of 87 percent.9 As expected, females have higher education levels than
males. State expenditures per pupil have increased over time whereas pupil teacher ratios
have decreased. Teacher salaries have not changed much since the 1960s.
If teenage students allocate their time between attending school, working and leisure, an
increase in time spent on attending school or studying should be accompanied by a decrease
either in work hours, leisure or both. To support and complement the ACS ndings, we use
data from the 1993-2008 rounds of Monitoring the Future (MTF) surveys to analyze how
NPND laws a¤ect young adultsallocation of time. The next subsection describes this data
in detail.
3.3 Monitoring the Future (MTF)
The MTF surveys approximately 50,000 12th graders every year since 1975 and 8th and 10th
graders since 1991.10 The survey is meant to identify changes in young adultsviews, atti-
tudes, and behaviors overtime. Though the primary purpose of MTF is to gather information
on substance abuse by teens, the data also contain useful information on teensallocation
of time. In addition, it includes basic demographic information such as age, sex, race, and
parents education. A multistage random sampling procedure is used to draw a nationally
representative sample of students from approximately 135 schools. First, the geographical
areas are randomly selected, then schools within areas are chosen with the probability being
proportional to the size of senior school classes. In the nal step, full classes are randomly
selected within schools.
Since the MTF has been surveying 8thand 10th since 1991, our sample comprises data
on 15-17 year olds from 1991 onwards. We study 15-17 years olds because NPND laws only
a¤ect minors who are eligible for a drivers license, and in most states minimum age for a
9We treat GEDs as high school dropouts following Heckman and LaFontaine (2010)
10The MTF survey is self-administered and information that can be used to identify individuals is held
condential. We came to an agreement with the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan who
kindly agreed on running our programs on site and provided us with the output tables.
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learners permit is 15 years.
The MTF collects data on the average time per week or per day spent on a range of
activities including work, going out with friends, watching TV, sports or exercise, reading
books and homework. For our study, we focus on survey questions that indicate the channels
through which NPND laws might a¤ect the allocation of time between educational invest-
ment, work, and leisure. For instance, the MTF asks respondents whether they work and
the number of hours they work. We use this variable to study the e¤ect of NPND laws on
allocation of time towards work. The survey also asks respondents how often they go out for
parties or on dates, play sports, watch TV etc. We use these variables to proxy for leisure
activities. We also test if NPND laws have an e¤ect on time invested in education activities.
We use the time spent doing homework and the probability of skipping school as proxies for
investment in education. Finally, as an extension to our basic framework, we also look at
the e¤ect of NPND on driving outcomes in the MTF.
Table 3 presents the outcome variables and demographic characteristics by gender and
race. There are no statistically signicant di¤erences by race or gender in the background
characteristics. However, we can see some interesting di¤erences in the choices made. For
instance, consistent with a broad literature on gender di¤erences in academic achievement, in
our sample, females have a higher Grade Point Average (GPA) than boys. Also, blacks have
lower average GPA than non-blacks. We also nd truancy to be most prominent among
blacks. Among the di¤erent groups, females spend the highest amount of time per week
doing homework while blacks have the lowest hours. When we look at employment, the raw
data suggests that boys are slightly more likely to work than girls. Interestingly, there are
no signicant di¤erences across the groups in leisure activities such as going out on dates or
to parties. However, blacks spend much more time, on an average, watching television.
For the MTF, we estimate the following model:
Yist = 0 + 1NPNDst + 2Xist + 3Zst + S + T + ist (2)
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where i denotes individual, s denotes state, and t refers to time. Y is the outcome of
interest (education, work, leisure and driving). NPND is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if state s has the NPND law in place at time t. X is a vector of individual
student characteristics that includes age, maximum parental education, race, a dummy equal
to one if the student lives in a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), and a male
dummy in the full sample models. Zst includes potentially relevant time-varying state-level
controls. These include macroeconomic variables (log of per-capita income, log of population
and unemployment rate), education controls (log of per-pupil expenditures in education, log
of teachers salary and the ratio of pupils per teachers) and tra¢ c related variables (log of
vehicle miles traveled and log of total motor vehicle fatalities among 15-17 year olds). All
income and expenditure variables are ination-adjusted. S and T are state and time xed
e¤ects, respectively. Standard errors are clustered both at the year and state levels.
The e¤ect of NPND laws on allocation of time has to be interpreted carefully for two
reasons. First, time spent on leisure or work may decrease not because individuals choose
to devote more time to study, but because they might not be able to drive to work or to
a party. However, as shown in Section 4, our results suggest that high schools students in
NPND states were more likely to get license and were driving more. We also show an e¤ect
on work hours. Regardless of the reason behind changes to time allocation, if high school
graduation rates increase as a result of the NPND laws, it should be at the expense of either
leisure, work or both.
Second, the MTF is a selected sample of teenagers who have not dropped out from school.
This would be a problem if we want to measure the e¤ect of NPND laws on allocation of
time among teenagers who drop out of school before the law is passed. If some of them drive
to work, we would expect a drop in their work hours after the policy is implemented. We
acknowledge this data constraint and interpret the MTF results as the e¤ect of the law on
allocation of time among the selected sample of individuals who are attending school.
Our coe¢ cient of interest, 1, captures within state changes in studentsoutcomes
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in states where a NPND is enacted with respect to the associated changes in outcomes of
students in states where a law has not yet been enacted. The identifying assumption is that
there are no unobserved changes in variables related to both student outcomes and NPND
laws that are di¤erentially a¤ecting treatment and control states. For example if NPND laws
were enacted together with other tra¢ c laws a¤ecting teenagers, we would nd a decrease
in leisure and in probability of driving for teenagers which may not entirely be attributed to
NPND laws. We carry out robustness checks to ensure internal validity of our estimates. We
introduce education control variables that a¤ect education and might have changed during
the time when the laws were being enacted. Similarly, we include state-specic linear time
trends to capture time-varying unobserved characteristics at the state level. Our results are
robust to addition of these variables.
4 Results
4.1 American Community Survey (2009)
Table 4 shows results for the e¤ect of NPND laws on high school graduation. Column (1)
reports estimates from the sparest specication without any control variables. As expected,
the sign on the treatment variable is negative and should be interpreted as NPND laws being
enacted in states with low graduation rates. However the coe¢ cient switches signs upon
including state and cohort xed e¤ects in column (2). The complete model in column (3)
suggests that NPND laws had a positive and signicant e¤ect on high school graduation rates.
In particular, NPND laws are associated with an increase of 1.1 percent in graduation rates.
The e¤ect is slightly larger for boys than for girls. However, given that the graduation rate for
girls is higher than for boys (Table 2), these numbers translate to almost similar percentage
changes in graduation rates for both groups. The specications in Columns (3)-(5) include
state level macroeconomic controls for unemployment rate, log of per capita income and log
population. As can be seen from comparing columns (2) and (3), the estimates are robust
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to inclusion of state macroeconomic and education controls.
Table 5 shows analogous regression estimates with education attainment as the outcome
variable. Once again, NPND laws led to an increase in education attainment among cohorts
a¤ected. However, unlike the results for high school completion rates, the e¤ect on educa-
tional attainment is only visible for boys. This is an interesting result because several studies
on nancial incentives nd that girls react to positive incentives or carrots while boys do
not. However, the results from Table 5 show that boys are reacting to sticks more than girls.
We cannot determine if that is because boys react more than girls to carrots or because boys
have a preference for driving and girls do not.
One of the main concerns in these estimates is that the results may be inuenced by
underlying state-specic trends. More importantly, education attainment among girls has
been increasing during the period of study and this could be biasing the results in Table
5. Since NPND laws vary both by cohorts and by state, we cannot include state-cohort
interactions. Nonetheless, in Table 6 we include state-specic linear time trends to address
this concern.
Columns (1), (2) and (3) show results for educational attainment as the dependent vari-
able while columns (4) to (6) show results for graduation rates. As suspected, upon inclusion
of state-specic time trends, Table 6 shows that NPND laws have no signicant e¤ect on
education outcomes for females. The coe¢ cients in columns (3) and (6) are close to zero and
statistically insignicant. Among boys, the treated cohorts have 0.1 more years of education
and are 1.5 percentage point more likely to graduate from high school. Moreover, both ef-
fects are statistically signicant at 1%. The mean attainment and graduation rates among
males is 13.29 years and 0.84 respectively. Thus, as a result of NPND laws, males have 0.8
percentage points higher educational attainment and are 1.8 percentage point more likely
to graduate from high school. As expected, the e¤ect on average educational attainment
is smaller relative to high school graduation rates. This is because the law would have the
largest e¤ect on marginal students who are at the risk of dropping out, and these students
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are least likely to invest in higher levels of education.
Since black youths constitute a disproportionately large proportion of dropout popula-
tion, and NPND targets teens at risk of dropping out, we should expect a larger e¤ect for
this subgroup.11 Table 7 presents the estimates from separate regressions by race among
males.
Black cohorts a¤ected by the NPND law have 0.35 more years of education and are
almost 5% more likely to graduate from high school. This is a large e¤ect and translates
to a 2.8 percentage point increase in average educational attainment among black males
(the mean education for this group is 12.53 years) and a 6.4 percentage point increase in
the probability of graduating from high school (mean graduation is 0.73). We also nd a
marginal positive e¤ect on educational attainment among white males though the estimated
coe¢ cient is measured with imprecision and is signicant only at the 10% level. Taken
together, the results suggests that the law had the largest e¤ect on males and in particular
among disadvantaged groups.
To put things in perspective, the results seem to be consistent with the idea that the
e¤ect of NPND laws should be the largest for students who have a preference for driving and
are disadvantaged. Thus, assuming that males have a greater preference for driving, it is not
surprising that our results suggest that women are least likely to be a¤ected by NPND laws
and black males are most a¤ected.
4.2 Robustness Checks
A potential concern with our identication strategy is that education outcome may be af-
fected by other unobserved education policies that were also changing around the same time
as NPND laws. One policy that has received a lot of attention recently is the minimum
school entry age laws. In the 1960s children were allowed to start kindergarten when they
11We only report results for males by race. In similar regressions for females, as expected from results
shown in Table 6, none of the estimates were signicant at conventional levels. These tables are available
upon request.
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were considerably less than ve years old. However, over the last four decades, there has
been a shift in policy and most states have increased the minimum entrance age. If school
entry age laws changed around the same time as NPND laws, our results would not correctly
capture the e¤ect of NPND laws. This is even more relevant because the literature nds
that older children tend to perform better in school and complete more years of schooling
(Barua and Lang, 2010).
To address this concern, we estimate the regressions controlling for the minimum age at
which the state allows the child to enroll in kindergarten. For instance, if a state law requires
that the child must turn 5 by 1st September, the youngest child in kindergarten in that state
would be 60 months old (assuming school starts on 1st September). Similarly, if the state law
requires the child to turn 5 by December 1st, the youngest entrant to kindergarten would be
4 years and 9 months old (i.e. 57 months). Using state of birth as the identier, we merge
census data with school entry age laws that were in place in the year all individuals in our
sample turned 5.
Table 8, Columns (3) and (4), show results for the e¤ect of NPND laws on educational
attainment and graduation rates, respectively, controlling for the minimum school entry
age (in months). We only present estimates among males (shown in panel A) and black
males (shown in panel B), the group that is most a¤ected by the policy.12 Columns (1)
and (2) reproduce results from table 6 and table 7 for education outcomes among males and
black males. The inclusion of the entry age variable has a negligible e¤ect on the NPND
coe¢ cient for both education outcome variables for males. Moreover, the coe¢ cient on
entry age variable is close to zero and statistically insignicant. Including minimum entry
age makes the coe¢ cient on black males (panel B) larger and the estimates are still highly
signicant. The e¤ect on graduation almost doubles and is now 0.074 which translates to a
10 percentage point increase in graduation rates among black males.
As an additional internal validity test, we use a faketreatment group to see if education
12Regressions for women and the entire sample also yield estimates that do not change with inclusion of
entry age variable.
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outcomes are reacting to any other factors that a¤ect di¤erent cohorts in a particular way.
Individuals who were more than 19 years old at the time of the enactment of the NPND law
should not be a¤ected by these laws. Not only are most of these individuals out of school but
also they are above the maximum age at which the NPND law is applicable. We estimate a
placebo model where the treatmentgroup includes individuals who are between 19 and 21
years of age and the controlgroup comprises of individuals between ages 22 to 24. If the
regression estimate is signicantly di¤erent from 0 for the placebo groups, the trends are not
parallel, and our original estimate is likely to be biased. As we can see in columns (5) and
(6) in table 8, for both males and blacks, the coe¢ cient on NPND for the placebo groups is
close to zero and statistically insignicant. However, the coe¢ cient in column (6) on black
males is non trivial, though the standard errors are larger possibly due to the small sample
size.
Even if other policies are not confounding our estimates, the policy intervention could be
a response to a third factor that simultaneously inuences the policy implementation and
education outcomes. For example, a sudden increase in teen tra¢ c fatality rates or tra¢ c
violations could lead to states passing NPND laws. At the same time, due to the increased
accident rates or violations, parents forbid their children from driving to school and that
inuences their allocation of time and education outcomes. Moreover, one can argue that
NPND laws will be more e¤ective in states where vehicle usage is higher due to geographic
factors or cultural reasons. Therefore, only states in which the policy would have been
e¤ective apply NPND laws and the outcome depends on who is being treated.
Table 9 presents results from the ACS with two additional state level tra¢ c control vari-
ables: the log of vehicle miles traveled and the log of total motor vehicle fatalities among
15-17 year olds. The data on vehicle miles is collected from the Federal Highway Adminis-
tration (FHWA). The tra¢ c fatalities data is collected from the Fatality Analysis Reporting
System (FARS). To be consistent with the other variables, we merge this data correspond-
ing to the year the individual turns 13. However, FARS data is only available since 1975,
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whereas the oldest cohort in our sample turns 13 in 1971 (i.e. those born in 1958). Thus,
table 9 excludes data from 1971 until 1974 and that explains the di¤erence in number of
observations from previous tables.
We show results for the entire sample, males and black males. Upon inclusion of tra¢ c
variables, the coe¢ cients are even larger in magnitude, especially for black males in column
3 and 6, and are still estimated with a lot of precision. Moreover, in column 5, the coe¢ cient
on teen tra¢ c fatalities is negative and signicant for the graduation regression.
Overall, the results strongly suggest that NPND laws did indeed increase educational
attainment and graduation rates among males in the U.S. Given this observed shift in time
invested in education, how do NPND laws a¤ect work-leisure time allocation? To address
this question and to further support the Census estimates, in the next section, we show
results using data from Monitoring the Future (MTF) survey.
4.3 Monitoring the Future
In this section, we present results for 15 to 17 year olds from the di¤erences-in-di¤erences
specication given in equation (2). Results are shown for the complete specication outlined
in section 3.3 and includes all individual level control variables, state/year level education
and macroeconomic controls and two tra¢ c control variables.13 All regressions also include
state e¤ects, year e¤ects and state-specic time trends. For all tables, column (1) shows
results for the entire sample, columns (2) and (3) estimates the model separately by gender
while columns (4) and (5) present estimates by race for blacks and non-blacks respectively.
Table 10 reports estimates with school-related outcomes as the dependent variable. Panel
A shows results for grades, panel B reports estimates for probability of skipping school and
in panel C the outcome variable is hours spent doing homework. Though the e¤ect of NPND
13To be consistent with the census data, in all the MTF tables shown below, we include the same set
of control variables that we used in the census estimates. However, in tables not shown in the paper (but
available upon request), we have estimated versions of the baseline model including recent state laws related
to driving. Our results are robust to including Graduated Driver Licensing (GDL) laws and Seatbelt use
laws.
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on grades is positive for all groups except females, none of the coe¢ cients are statistically
signicant. Thus it seems that NPND laws have no e¤ect on academic performance.
In most states the law not only requires that the teenager be enrolled in school but also
enforces a minimum attendance requirement. Panel B shows results for equation (2) where
the outcome of interest is likelihood of skipping school. Teens who are in states with the
NPND law are 7 percentage point less likely to be truants and the e¤ect is signicant at
5% (the coe¢ cient is 0.018 while the mean for days skipped is 0.26). Interestingly, when we
compare columns (2) and (3), we nd that the e¤ect is larger for females and insignicant
for males.
A possible explanation for this result could be sample selection. The MTF only records
information for non-dropouts. In states with NPND laws, the sample includes individuals
who were at the margin for dropping out but decided not to because of the fear of losing
their driving privileges. We would expect these marginalstudents to have a higher truancy
rate. Note that, due to having only non-dropouts in the MTF, selection is likely to be most
pronounced for blacks since results from the census suggests that blacks had the largest
increase in graduation rates. Therefore, the coe¢ cients are underestimating the possible
positive e¤ect on blacks and should be a lower bound on the actual estimates. If the bias
due to selection is large enough, we might nd that there is no e¤ect (or even negative) of
NPND. This would be more true for blacks, who are more disadvantaged, than for girls and
that might be an explanation why the coe¢ cients are positive for girls and not for blacks.
Finally, in panel C, we study the e¤ect on hours spent in doing homework. Blacks spend
about 1 more hour doing homework each week and the result is signicant at 1%. This is
a large e¤ect relative to the average (5.74 hours) and translates to a 17% increase in the
average daily time spent doing HK. We also nd that in a state with an NPND law, the
average male spend more hours doing homework.
In Table 11, we present results where the outcome variable is employment. Panel A
reports estimates for probability of working while panel B shows results on hours spent
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working as the dependent variable. The coe¢ cient for each of the groups is close to zero
in panel A suggesting that NPND has no e¤ect on a teenagers probability of employment.
However, we do nd a decrease in hours spent on the job each week. The results are strongest
for males and blacks. In particular, males work about 0.15 hours less each week while blacks
reduce hours of work by 0.2 hours in states with NPND laws. There seems to be substitution
going on between work and study, however, we explore this further by looking at the e¤ect
on leisure activities.
Table 12 reports estimates for the e¤ect of NPND on leisure activities where leisure is
proxied by the number of times a teenager goes out every week on dates, parties and hours
spent watching television.14
MTF asks students how often do you go out with a date? The response categories
are: never; once a month or less; 2 or 3 times a month; once a week; 2 or 3 times a week;
over three times a week. The estimated coe¢ cients in Panel A are from an ordered probit
regression that take into account this count nature of the variable.
The sign of the coe¢ cients suggests that students in NPND states decreased the frequency
of going out on dates. The e¤ect is largest for non-blacks and females and signicant at 1%,
while blacks are not decreasing their frequency of going out on dates. Panel B shows ordered
probit estimates for the frequency of going out for parties. The results suggest that women
are reducing time invested in leisure activities but there is no strong evidence for males.
This points towards the selection of non-dropouts in the sample. Since NPND does not have
a signicant e¤ect on the dropout rates for women, we observe a clear decline in leisure
activities for them. On the other hand, for boys and blacks, NPND let to an increase in
graduation rates. However, the law would have the largest e¤ect on individuals who were at
the margin of dropping out. These students would also be most likely to be heavy consumers
of leisure activities. Thus, including them in the MTF sample makes the results less clear
14The MTF also reports a broad range of other leisure activities. We did not nd any e¤ect of NPND on
hours spent playing sports, going to the movies, playing videogames, going out with friends or going to a
mall.
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for this group.
Finally, from Panel C, we observe that blacks in states with the NPND laws are spending
less time watching television. They spend about 6 percent less time watching TV and the
e¤ect is also highly statistically signicant at 1%.
To sum up, NPND laws led to a redistribution in allocation of time with respect to work,
study and leisure. In particular, blacks and males are spending more time doing school
work and less time working. Moreover, blacks, in states with NPND laws, are spending less
time watching television. Among women, there is an increase in school attendance at the
expense of leisure activities but not work. For the entire sample, we nd less truancy, fewer
hours spent on the job and decrease in frequency of going out on dates. It is important
to keep in mind that, due to having only non-dropouts in the sample, the MTF results are
underestimating the true e¤ects of the law. However, it is reassuring that women, for whom
we nd no signicant e¤ect on education outcomes in the ACS, are also reallocating their
time as a result of NPND laws.
4.4 Driving Outcomes
As an extension of our basic framework, we also studied the e¤ect of NPND laws on driving
outcomes in the MTF. In these regressions, we also include 18 year olds in the sample because
driving-related questions are only asked to 12th graders.
Table 13, panel A, B and C, presents estimates for the e¤ect of NPND laws on probability
of holding a driving license, miles driven in a car per weekand probability of having
an accident in the last 12 months respectively.15 The coe¢ cients in Panel B for driving
are from an ordered probit model. The results indicate that all groups except non-blacks
have a high likelihood of holding a driving license with the largest e¤ect, 2 percent, among
blacks. Moreover, in states with NPND laws, blacks are driving more miles per week and are
15We also studied the e¤ect of NPND on some other driving related outcome variables in the MTF dataset:
driving under the inuence of alcohol/drugs and seatbelt use. We do not nd any signicant e¤ects on these
outcome variables. Tables are available upon request.
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4 percentage points less likely to have tra¢ c accidents. We also nd a negative coe¢ cient on
accidents for females, however, the coe¢ cient is much smaller in magnitude and is imprecisely
estimated.
It is not surprising that the e¤ect of NPND laws on driving licenses and miles driven
is positive. If the law makes individuals stay in school, it is precisely because they have a
preference for driving. Thus, in states with NPND, those who are enrolled in school have a
strong preference for driving and are more likely to hold a license.
What is not clear is whether the e¤ect on accidents can be interpreted as causal. Theo-
retically, the mechanism through which education a¤ects accidents can be compared to the
literature that measures the e¤ect of education on negative externalities with large social
costs, such as crime. Lochner and Moretti (2004) show that an additional year of schooling
is associated with a 0.37 percentage point reduction in incarceration for blacks. Compara-
bly, if education increases ones patience or risk aversion, we should expect more educated
individuals to be safer drivers. Thus, one interpretation of these results is that NPND laws,
indirectly through its e¤ect on education, could also have externality e¤ects on accidents.16
However, another interpretation that is consistent with the results is that NPND laws led
to a decrease in the number of risky drivers on the roads. Individuals who were not enrolled
in school and/or were habitual truants would have lost their driving privileges. Thus the
negative e¤ect on accidents could simply reect the change in age composition of drivers
due to the smaller number of teen drivers on the roads. We are not aware of any nationally
representative dataset that has individual level data on accidents, education and state level
identiers that allows us to test these di¤erent interpretation of our driving results. We leave
that for future research.
16We have also attempted to test this theory using the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) that
maintains data regarding fatal injuries su¤ered in motor vehicle tra¢ c crashes in the US. Negative binomial
regression models of the e¤ect of NPND law on state level accident fatalities among teenagers using the
data yielded negative but statistically insignicant results. However, this data is at the state level and only
includes accidents that led to a fatal outcome.
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5 Discussion
Parents and educators use many discipline methods that involve carrots to tempt a child
to cooperate and behave well or alternately use sticks or threats to shape certain behavior.
The theoretical rationale behind using such approaches is that low-achieving individuals have
high discount rates and the use of carrots and sticks motivates them to change their behavior.
While social psychologists have long debated the e¤ect of incentives on intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation, economists have recently begun evaluating numerous positive incentive policies.
The main advantage of positive incentive policies is that they are fairly easy to implement
and they increase the set of choices a child has and therefore it should not decrease their
utility. However, they are costly to administer and do not always seem to work for boys.
Moreover, though the e¤ect of positive incentives on performance is well researched, their
e¤ect on long run outcomes such as educational attainment is less clear.
Negative incentive policies are not so popular among policy makers because they de-
crease choices available to children and the benets might be short-run. Moreover empirical
researchers would confront ethical conicts when running randomized experiments with neg-
ative incentives. Nevertheless, parents and educators continue to use sticks to discipline
and motivate low performing children. For instance, grounding and time-out are common
approaches used by parents. Policy-makers across the world are also increasingly making
use of negative incentives to keep students from dropping out of school. A recent Australian
policy requires that teen parents be enrolled in school to receive welfare payments.17 In the
U.S., high school students who do not pass a certain number of subjects are not allowed to
play sports. Thus, it is surprising that not much research has evaluated the e¤ect of negative
incentive policies on educational achievement.
In this paper, we show that the No Pass No Drive (NPND) law, a U.S. state level
negative incentive policy, has positive and signicant e¤ect on educational attainment among
17http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-05-05/teen-parents-targeted-in-welfare-crackdown/2704204
24
a¤ected cohorts and the e¤ect is mainly driven by boys and blacks. This has several policy
implications. First, in addition to having direct implications on the labor market, this could
also have externality e¤ects. For example, Lochner and Moretti (2004) estimate that 23%
of the di¤erence in incarceration rates between blacks and whites could be eliminated by
raising the average education levels of blacks to the same level as that of whites. Second, the
increase in years of completed education is especially striking when one considers that the
NPND policy is almost costless to states. On the other hand, nancial incentive programs
are costly to implement and their e¤ect on long term education outcomes has not been well
researched, at least in the United States. Moreover, for developing countries, conditional
cash transfers end up occupying signicant portions of total education budgets. Third, the
dropout rates are alarmingly high among disadvantaged groups. Thus the optimal policy
must target groups such as blacks and hispanics in particular.
The results from this paper therefore suggest that it is worth taking advantage of natural
experiments to evaluate the intended and unintended consequences of low-cost negative
incentive policies. Negative incentives, when not too extreme and when targeted towards
an activity that students have a preference for, might be an e¤ective means to improve
educational outcomes among individuals, especially the disadvantaged groups.
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Figure 1: States with No Pass No Drive Laws (2008)
Table 1: Summary of No Pass No Drive Laws in 2008
NPND (2008) Attendance
Requirement
Progress in
School
Student
Behavior
(Suspensions,
expulsions etc)
Min
Age
Max Age
Alabama
Arkansas
California
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Mississippi
Nevada
New Mexico
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
15
14
13
-
15
15
15
-
15
-
13
16
15
15
14
-
15
-
14
15
15
15
15
16
15
16
18
18
18
-
18
18
18
18
18
18
-
18
18
18
-
-
18
18
18
18
17
18
18
18
18
18
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Individual Level Variables
Cohort 1960 1970 1980 All
Educational attainment 13.49 13.71 13.37 13.48
(2.10) (2.05) (1.91) (2.03)
Males 13.36 13.49 13.14 13.29
(2.18) (2.12) (1.96) (2.10)
Females 13.62 13.91 13.60 13.66
(2.02) (1.95) (1.84) (1.94)
High school graduation 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.87
(0.33) (0.33) (0.35) (0.34)
Males 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.84
(0.35) (0.36) (0.38) (0.36)
Females 0.90 0.91 0.89 0.90
(0.31) (0.29) (0.31) (0.30)
Males 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.49
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Blacks 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11
(0.31) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32)
Observations 356,371 287,352 297,661 1.059,305
State-specific Economic Variables
Cohort 1960 1970 1980 All
Log (Per capita income) 8.94 9.70 10.12 9.50
(0.30) (0.21) (0.18) (0.65)
Log (Population) 15.69 15.78 15.94 15.79
(0.88) (0.89) (0.92) (0.90)
Unemployment rate 6.99 6.99 5.24 6.36
(2.18) (2.05) (1.31) (2.02)
State-specific Education Variables
Cohort 1960 1970 1980 All
Log (Expenditure/pupil) 7.98 8.21 8.79 8.30
(0.23) (0.25) (0.39) (0.48)
Pupil teacher ratio 19.84 17.80 16.87 18.50
(1.99) (2.47) (2.63) (2.84)
Log (Teacher salary) 10.03 10.09 10.12 10.08
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Salaries and expenditures are inflation-adjusted.
Educational attainment is in years.
Table 2: ACS 2009  Descriptive Statistics by Cohort
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All Males Females Blacks Non-blacks
Education Outcomes
                           Grade Point Average (GPA) 6.03 5.78 6.30 5.80 6.1
(2.18) (2.21) (2.11) (2.13) (2.1)
                           Truancy 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.33 0.23
(0.44) (0.43) (0.42) (0.47) (0.42)
                           Hours doing homework 6.85 6.25 7.45 5.74 7.06
(6.40) (6.08) (6.65) (6.03) (6.45)
Employment Outcomes
                           Work 0.50 0.51 0.47 0.52 0.48
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.81) (0.50)
                           Hours worked a day 2.50 2.61 2.39 2.71 2.44
(2.05) (2.13) (1.97) (2.24) (2.00)
Leisure Activities
                           Going out on dates 2.57 2.59 2.55 2.58 2.57
(1.59) (1.56) (1.62) (1.60) (1.59)
                           Going out for parties 3.11 3.08 3.13 3.09 3.11
(0.95) (0.98) (0.91) (1.01) (0.94)
                           Hours watching television per day 2.54 2.62 2.46 3.56 2.38
(1.54) (1.53) (1.54) (1.50) (1.48)
Age 16.5 16.48 16.51 16.65 15.91
(0.85) (0.83) (0.86) (1.76) (1.67)
Lives in a Statistical Metropolitan Area 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.80 0.75
(0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.4) (0.43)
Max. parent's education  some high school 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05
(0.23) (0.22) (0.25) (0.22) (0.22)
                                   High school graduate 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.21
(0.41) (0.41) (0.42) (0.4) (0.41)
                                   Some college 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.17
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.38)
                                   College graduate 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.25 0.3
(0.47) (0.47) (0.49) (0.43) (0.46)
                                   More than college 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.26 0.18
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.43) (0.39)
Observations 914,910 425,509 452,250 215,455 699,455
Weighted statistics
The GPA variable is recoded as D=1, C - =2, and so on up to A=9.
Going out for dates & party are the average nights a week a student goes out at night/party and ranges from zero to three or more
                              Table 3: Monitoring the Future Descriptive Statistics
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Males Only Females Only
Treatment -0.030*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Male -0.053***
(0.001)
White 0.063*** 0.070*** 0.057***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Black -0.019*** -0.049*** 0.007*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Pupil teacher ratio -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log (Teacher Salary) 0.006 0.008 0.004
(0.011) (0.015) (0.014)
Log (Expenditure/pupil) 0.013 0.008 0.017
(0.009) (0.013) (0.011)
State of birth ü ü ü ü
Year of birth ü ü ü ü
Observations 987,654 987,654 987,536 486,488 501,048
Standard errors clustered at the state and cohort levels.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Columns (3)-(5) include unemployment rate, log (per capita income) and log (population)
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
Table 4: The Effect of NPND Law on High School Graduation (ACS 2009)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Males Only Females Only
Treatment -0.127*** 0.001 0.045*** 0.071*** 0.019
(0.008) (0.021) (0.015) (0.020) (0.018)
Male -0.357***
(0.006)
White 0.414*** 0.437*** 0.392***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.021)
Black -0.249*** -0.395*** -0.121***
(0.022) (0.026) (0.025)
Pupil teacher ratio -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Log (Teacher Salary) 0.155** 0.104 0.198**
(0.076) (0.100) (0.098)
Log (Expenditure/pupil) 0.095 0.103 0.093
(0.065) (0.085) (0.079)
State of birth ü ü ü ü
Year of birth ü ü ü ü
Observations 839,643 839,643 839,643 411,734 427,909
Standard errors clustered at the state and cohort levels.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Columns (3)-(5) include unemployment rate, log (per capita income) and log (population)
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
Educational attainment is in years.
 Table 5: The Effect of NPND Law on Educational Attainment (ACS 2009)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attainment All Attainment Males Attainment Females Graduation All Graduation Males Graduation Females
Treatment 0.062*** 0.100*** 0.027 0.009*** 0.015*** 0.004
(0.023) (0.031) (0.030) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Male -0.357*** -0.053***
(0.006) (0.001)
White 0.409*** 0.432*** 0.388*** 0.063*** 0.070*** 0.057***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Black -0.251*** -0.398*** -0.123*** -0.019*** -0.049*** 0.008*
(0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Pupil teacher ratio -0.008** -0.007 -0.009* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log (Teacher Salary) 0.285*** 0.240** 0.330*** 0.024** 0.027 0.021
(0.078) (0.114) (0.097) (0.011) (0.016) (0.014)
Log (Expenditure/pupil) -0.068 -0.083 -0.053 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008
(0.065) (0.091) (0.083) (0.009) (0.014) (0.012)
Observations 839,643 411,734 427,909 987,536 486,488 501,048
Standard errors clustered at the state and cohort levels.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include state and cohort dummies, state-specific linear time trends, unemployment rate, log (per capita income) and log (population)
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
Educational attainment is in years.
      Table 6: Effect of NPND Laws on Educational Attainment and High School Graduation with State-specific Time Trends (ACS 2009)
                                             Table 7: Effect of NPND Laws on Education by Race (Males Only)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Attainment Blacks Attainment Whites Graduation Blacks Graduation Whites
Treatment 0.346*** 0.055* 0.047** 0.004
(0.093) (0.032) (0.019) (0.006)
Observations 42,881 345,126 52,329 402,457
Standard errors clustered at the state and cohort levels.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include state and cohort dummies, state-specific linear time trends, unemployment rate, log (per capita income)
log (population), log (teacher salaries), log (expenditures per pupil), and pupil per teacher ratio
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
Educational attainment is in years.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attainment:
Baseline
Graduation:
Baseline
Attainment:
Minimum Entry
Age
Graduation:
Minimum Entry
Age
Attainment:
Placebo
Graduation:
Placebo
Panel A : Males Only
Treatment 0.100*** 0.015*** 0.088*** 0.018*** -0.003 0.010
(0.031) (0.005) (0.032) (0.006) (0.040) (0.007)
Entry age -0.013 0.000
(0.009) (0.001)
Observations 411,734 486,488 331,142 391,186 43,166 43,166
Panel B:  Black Males
Treatment 0.346*** 0.047** 0.419*** 0.074*** 0.031 0.032
(0.093) (0.019) (0.102) (0.020) (0.095) (0.021)
Entry Age 0.014 0.005
(0.024) (0.005)
Observations 42,881 52,329 35,653 43,933 5,372 5,372
Standard errors clustered at the state and cohort levels.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include state and cohort dummies, state-specific linear time trends, unemployment rate, log (per capita income)
log (population), log (teacher salaries), log (expenditures per pupil), and pupil per teacher ratio
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
Educational attainment is in years.
Table 8: Effect of NPND Laws on Education: Robustness Checks for Males and Blacks (ACS 2009)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attainment All Attainment Males Attainment Blacks Graduation All Graduation Males Graduation Blacks
Treatment 0.064** 0.112*** 0.445*** 0.012*** 0.023*** 0.073***
(0.025) (0.035) (0.105) (0.004) (0.006) (0.020)
Log (Vehicle miles) 0.015 0.038 0.011 -0.000 -0.001 -0.009
(0.017) (0.025) (0.087) (0.002) (0.003) (0.012)
Log (Traffic fatalities) -0.033 -0.047 -0.018 -0.003 -0.011** -0.019
(0.022) (0.032) (0.101) (0.003) (0.005) (0.017)
Observations 678,503 333,301 35,274 826,396 408,055 44,722
Standard errors clustered at the state and cohort levels.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include state and cohort dummies, state-specific linear time trends, unemployment rate, log (per capita income)
log (population), log (teacher salaries), log (expenditures per pupil), and pupil per teacher ratio
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
Educational attainment is in years.
Table 9: Effect of NPND Laws on Education Controlling for Traffic Variables
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Male Female Black Non-Blacks
Panel A: Grades
NPND 0.024 0.077 -0.022 0.028 0.011
(0.047) (0.060) (0.053) (0.093) (0.054)
Observations 355,541 165,814 189,727 66,636 288,905
Panel B:  Probability of Skipping School
NPND -0.018** -0.015 -0.020** -0.020 -0.016*
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010)
Observations 362,458 169,479 192,979 69,269 293,189
Panel C:  Hours Spent Doing Homework a Da y
NPND 0.197 0.359** 0.062 0.964*** -0.070
(0.158) (0.161) (0.215) (0.223) (0.181)
Observations 261,414 126,462 134,952 40,773 220,641
Standard errors clustered at the state and year levels.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include unemployment rate, log(per capita income), log (population),
log(teacher salaries), log(expenditures per pupil), pupil per teacher ratio, log(traffic fatalities),
log(vehicle miles), year & state dummies, and state-specific time trends
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
The grade variable is recoded as D=1, C - =2, and so on up to A=9.
Table 10: Effect of NPND Laws on Grades, Skipping Classes, and  Homework
                    Table 11: Effect of NPND Laws on Employment Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Male Female Black Non-Blacks
Panel A:  Probability of Working
NPND -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.024 -0.008
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010)
Observations 362,458 169,479 192,979 69,269 293,189
Panel B: Hours Worked a Day
NPND -0.105* -0.145** -0.077 -0.180** -0.074
(0.054) (0.063) (0.065) (0.078) (0.059)
Observations 178,840 84,783 94,057 31,689 147,151
Standard errors clustered at the state and year levels.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include unemployment rate, log(per capita income), log (population),
log(teacher salaries), log(expenditures per pupil), pupil per teacher ratio, log(traffic fatalities),
log(vehicle miles), year & state dummies, and state-specific time trends
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
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                          Table 12: Effect of NPND Laws on Leisure Activities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Male Female Black Non-Blacks
Panel A:  Going out on a Date
NPND -0.067*** -0.052* -0.079*** -0.027 -0.081***
(0.021) (0.027) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025)
Observations 356,314 165,122 191,192 65,343 290,971
Panel B: Going out for Parties
NPND -0.023 0.031 -0.063** -0.015 -0.025
(0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031) (0.023)
Observations 291,930 140,297 151,633 47,974 243,956
Panel C:  Watching Television
NPND -0.030 -0.017 -0.043 -0.194*** 0.022
(0.033) (0.039) (0.037) (0.063) (0.034)
Observations 265,405 128,303 137,102 42,182 223,223
Standard errors clustered at the state and year levels.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include unemployment rate, log(per capita income), log (population),
log(teacher salaries), log(expenditures per pupil), pupil per teacher ratio, log(traffic fatalities),
log(vehicle miles), year & state dummies, and state-specific time trends
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
                       Table 13: Effect of NPND Laws on Driving and Accidents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Male Female Black Non-Blacks
Panel A: License
NPND 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.005** 0.019*** 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 731,960 347,990 383,970 144,997 586,963
Panel B: Driving
NPND 0.018 0.025 0.009 0.108*** -0.009
(0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.036) (0.027)
Observations 234,998 106,625 128,373 47,363 187,635
Panel C:  Accidents
NPND -0.016 -0.014 -0.018* -0.041** -0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.011)
Observations 731,960 347,990 383,970 144,997 586,963
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include unemployment rate, log(per capita income), log (population),
log(teacher salaries), log(expenditures per pupil), pupil per teacher ratio, log(traffic fatalities),
log(vehicle miles), year & state dummies, and state-specific time trends
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
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